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Abstract: Risk assessment models are conceptual 
constructs (translated into mathematical forms), built on a 
set of assumptions (hypotheses) made on the available 
knowledge. In this sense, the risk assessment outcomes 
are conditional on the available knowledge.  
Risk assessment provides informative support to 
decision making (DM), and assurance must be provided 
to guarantee that the results are credible and trustworthy 
for the DM purposes, for which they are employed.  
The present paper proposes a four-levels, top-down, 
hierarchical tree to identify the main attributes and criteria 
that affect the level of trustworthiness of models used in 
probabilistic risk assessment. Based on this hierarchical 
decomposition, a bottom up, quantitative approach is 
employed for the assessment of model trustworthiness, 
using tangible information and data available at the basic 
“leaf” sub-attributes level. The analytical hierarchical 
process (AHP) is adopted for evaluating and aggregating 
the sub-attributes. 
The approach is shown by application to a case study 
concerning the estimation of failure probability of the 
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system of a nuclear power 
plant (NPP). The trustworthiness of two models of 
different complexity is evaluated: a Fault Tree (FT) and a 
Multi-States Physics-based Model (MSPM). 
Keywords: Risk assessment, Risk-Informed Decision 
Making (RIDM), Model Trustworthiness and Credibility, 
Fault-tree, Multi-States Physical Based Model (MSPM), 
Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP), Strength-of-
Knowledge, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, Nuclear 




In general terms, risk describes the future 
consequences (usually seen in negative, undesirable terms 
with respect to the planned objectives) potentially arising 
from the operation of a system or an activity, and the 
associated uncertainty [1]. Risk should be quantitatively 
assessed in order to be possibly compare it with 
predefined safety criteria, for aiding risk-informed 
decision-making processes [2]. 
In recent times we have witnessed a vivid discussion 
on the fundamental concept of “risk” and related 
foundational issues regarding its assessment. From a 
general perspective, it is understood that the outcomes of 
risk assessments (i.e., the undesirable events/scenarios, 
consequences and the description of uncertainty about 
these) are conditioned on the background knowledge and 
information available on the system and/or process under 
analysis, including assumptions and presuppositions, 
phenomenological understanding, historical system 
performance data and expert judgments [3]; [4]; [5]; [6]. 
Then, the risk assessment outcomes may have a more 
or less solid foundation, depending on the validity of the 
assessment and hypotheses made, and quality and 
quantity of data and extents used: poor models, lack of 
data or simplistic assumptions are examples of potential 
sources of (model) uncertainty “hidden in the background 
knowledge” of a risk assessment [6]. 
As well known in practice the modeling of a system 
or process needs to balance between two conflicting 
concerns: (i) accurate representation of the phenomena 
and mechanisms in the system or process and (ii) 
definition of the proper level of detail of the description of 
the phenomena and mechanisms, so as to allow the timely 
and efficient use of the model. Differences between the 
real world quantities and the model outputs inevitably 
arise from the conflict of these two concerns [7]; [8]. 
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Since (i) the importance placed on modeling and 
simulation is increasingly high within safety-critical 
system engineering contexts and (ii) the fundamental 
value of a risk assessment lies in providing informative 
support to (high-consequence) decision making [9]; [2], 
the confidence that can be put in the accuracy, 
representativeness and completeness of the models is 
fundamental and a satisfactory level of assurance must be 
provided that the results obtained from such models are 
credible and trustworthy for the decision-making 
purposes for which they are employed [4]; [8]; [10]. 
The objective of the present paper is to propose a 
four levels, top-down, hierarchical tree-based decision-
making approach to assess the trustworthiness of models 
used in risk assessment. The level of trustworthiness is 
divided into two attributes (level 2), four sub-attributes 
(level 3), and seven basic “leaf” sub-attributes (level 4). 
At the bottom of the structure, we place the alternative 
models for which we want to assess the trustworthiness 
and credibility. On the basis of this hierarchical 
decomposition the level of trustworthiness is then 
calculated by resorting to a bottom-up, quantitative 
approach. The basic “leaf” attributes represent “tangible” 
attributes that can be directly and quantitatively evaluated 
using data and information available (e.g., past 
knowledge, experts, judgment, historical records, etc.). 
Finally, the Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) is 
employed for evaluating and aggregating the sub 
attributes. 
The proposed approach has been applied to assess the 
trustworthiness of two models (of different complexity 
and level of detail) of a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) 
System of the CPY900 Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) [11]: 
the two models are used to estimate the failure probability 
of the safety system of interest. The first model is based 
on a classical Boolean logic-based Fault Tree (FT). The 
components’ failure rates are based on field data and/or 
expert judgment. The model does not consider possible 
dependencies between the states of degradation of 
different components (e.g., a valve and a pump) nor the 
interaction between physical and environmental 
parameters, and the mechanisms of components’ 
degradation [11]. On the other hand, the second approach 
is based on a Multi-States Physics-based Model (MSPM). 
The analysis takes into account multiple time-dependent 
component’s degradation states, the effect of physical and 
environmental parameters on the mechanisms of 
degradation and the dependency existing between the 
degradation of components [12]; [13]. 
A review of approaches for assessing the 
trustworthiness and credibility of a model is presented in 
Section II. In Section III, we present a hierarchical tree-
based decision making approach for assessing model 
trustworthiness. In Section IV, we apply the proposed 
framework to the case study of the RHR system of a NPP. 
Finally, in Section V, we discuss the results and close the 
paper with some conclusions. 
 
II. TRUSTWORTHINESS AND CREDIBILITY OF 
RISK ASSESSMENT MODELS  
In this section, we review some approaches proposed 
in the literature to assess the trustworthiness and 
credibility of mathematical models. This has been, and 
still is, an issue of great significance in the nuclear 
industry, for the need of assuring the technical adequacy 
and trustworthiness of Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA) models. Indeed, it is an issue that has been at the 
forefront of using PRA for decision making for many 
years. In the Regulatory Guide RG 1.174 of the United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), PRA 
analysis trustworthiness and appropriateness (how well 
the risk is assessed) in the context of decision making are 
addressed with respect to the scope, level of detail, 
technical adequacy and plant representation [17]. The 
adequacy of the actual modeling and the reasonableness 
of the assumptions and approximations made are 
considered, and the full comprehension and inclusion of 
PRA elements are emphasized together with the need of 
addressing the impact of uncertainty [17]. Following up, 
RG 1.200 provides concrete guidelines on technical 
elements for a technically acceptable PRA, its peer review 
program documentation etc., to apply RG 1.174 for 
evaluating whether a PRA is sufficiently adequate and 
trustworthy to support decision making[18]. More 
recently, EPRI 3002003116 emphasizes the importance of 
evaluating the maturity and trustworthiness of risk 
assessments regarding different hazard groups of different 
natures and proposes an approach to overcome these 
difficulties within the RG.1174 context [19]. While these 
efforts do not use a hierarchical quantification approach; 
they do attempt to establish criteria and processes by 
which technical adequacy, mature, peer review, and other 
aspects are used to build confidence in the use of PRA 
models for regulatory risk-informed decision making use. 
In the literature, the trustworthiness of a method or a 
process is often measured in terms of its maturity. The 
concept of model maturity goes back to the 1970s: at the 
time, it was used to assess the maturity of a function of an 
information system [14]; [15]; [16].  Later, the Software 
Engineering Institute (SEI) has developed a framework 
(the so-called Capability Maturity Model (CMM)) to 
assess the maturity of a software development process, in 
view of its quality, reliability and trustworthiness. 
Recently, the CMM model has been extended into the 
Prediction Capability Maturity Model (PCMM) for 
evaluating and assessing the maturity of modeling and 
simulation efforts [14]. Other examples of maturity 
assessment approaches have been developed in different 
domains, such as master data maturity assessment, 
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Figure 1 A hierarchical tree-based “decomposition” of the 
level of trustworthiness and credibility of a model 
enterprise risk management and hospital information 
system [16]. Finally, a hierarchical framework based on 
the analytical hierarchical process (AHP) has been 
developed to assess the maturity and prediction capability 
of a prognostic method for maintenance decision making 
purposes [16]. 
On the other hand, qualitative and semi-quantitative 
approaches have been proposed for evaluating the 
“strength-of-knowledge” in risk assessment models. In [3] 
a “crude” qualitative, direct grading of the strength-of-
knowledge that supports risk assessment based on 
(mathematical) models is introduced. Actually, the 
authors try to classify the strength-of-knowledge to 
{minor, moderate, significant} with respect to the 
following elements [3]; [6]; [20]; [5]: )i) 
phenomenological understanding of the problem and 
availability of precise and well-understood predicting 
models for the physical phenomena of interest; )ii) 
availability of reliable data; )iii) reasonability of 
assumptions made (i.e., the assumptions do not exhibit 
large simplifications); )iv) agreement (consensus) among 
experts (i.e., low value ladenness). The strength-of-
knowledge is, then, classified according to the following 
criteria [3]; [5]; [6]; [20]: )1) if none of the previously 
mentioned components is met, then the knowledge is 
“weak”; )2) if the “requirements” are partially met, then 
the strength-of-knowledge is considered “intermediate”; 
)3) if all “requirements” are met, then the knowledge is 
considered “strong”. 
In [20], a more detailed, semi-quantitative approach 
(namely the “assumption deviation risk”) has been 
introduced. This approach is based on the identification of 
all the main assumptions on which the analysis is based. 
Then, the assumptions are converted into uncertainty 
factors and a rough evaluation of the deviation from the 
conditions defined by the assumptions is carried out. 
Finally, a score is assigned to each deviation that reflects 
the risk related to the deviation and its implications on the 
occurrence of given events and their consequences. 
In [6], the authors embrace, apply, test and adjust the 
perspectives of [3] and [20] to develop a general and 
systematic framework for treating (uncertain) 
assumptions in risk assessment models. Also, this 
methodology for assessing the importance of assumptions 
is based on evaluating the basic components of the risk 
description mentioned above and previously developed 
and adopted by [20]. The evaluation places an assumption 
in one of six “settings”, each providing guidelines to 
characterize the corresponding uncertainty. In practice, 
these guidelines are based on the precept that the effort 
that should be exerted for characterizing the uncertainty 
associated to an assumption and the effect on the related 
potential deviations, should increase with the importance 
and the criticality of the assumption. Finally, also in [8] 
the effect and importance of “structural” assumptions, 
approximations and simplifications on risk assessment 
model outputs [21] is studied by means of different 
approaches, including subjective and imprecise 
probabilities, and semi-quantitative scores (reflecting the 
degree of uncertainty associated to an assumption and the 
sensitivity of the model output to the assumption). The 
analysis serves as an input to the decision makers to 
understand which assumptions are unacceptable and need 
“remodeling”. 
 
III. HIERARCHICAL TREE-BASED DECISION 
MAKING APPROACH FOR ASSESSING THE 
TRUSTWORTHINESS OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
MODELS 
In section III.A, we present the four levels, top-down 
tree used to characterize the trustworthiness (of a risk 
assessment model) by decomposing it into sub-attributes 
(e.g., number of model’s assumptions, quantity of 
relevant data available, etc.) that can be quantified by the 
analysts; in Section III.B, we describe a bottom-up 
procedure, based on the analytical hierarchal process 
(AHP), to assess the model trustworthiness by evaluating 
and aggregating the sub-attributes (identified as “leaf” 
attributes). 
III.A. Hierarchical tree for model trustworthiness: 
extraction and decomposition 
Many factors affect the trustworthiness and 
credibility of models outcomes. Although they might 
sensibly vary depending on the problem at hand, some 
key factors can be summarized as follows:  (i) 
phenomenological understanding of the problem; (ii) 
availability of reliable data; (iii) reasonability of the 
assumptions made; (iv) agreement among the experts; (v) 
316PSA 2017, Pittsburgh, PA, September 24-28, 2017
 
 
level of detail in the description of the phenomena and 
process of interest; (vi) accuracy and precision in the 
estimation of the values of the model’s parameter; (vii) 
level of conservatism; (viii) amount of uncertainty, see 
e.g., [3]; [6]; [4]; [5]; [22]; [8]; [16]; [14]; [19]; [9]. Some 
of these attributes (criteria) are not “tangible” and cannot 
be “measured” directly: as a consequence, other sub-
attributes should be identified, which can be easily 
measured and/or qualitatively evaluated. To this aim, we 
propose a method for model trustworthiness 
characterization and decomposition, which is based on an 
analytical hierarchical tree, such as the one in Figure 1. 
The model trustworthiness, represented by T (Level 
1), is characterized by two attributes: modeling fidelity, 
represented by      and strength-of-knowledge, 
represented by       (Level 2). The modeling fidelity 
(    ), measures the adequacy of the model 
representation of the phenomenon and the level of detail 
adopted in the model description. The strength-of-
knowledge (    ) measures how “solid” the 
assumptions, data and information (on which the model 
relies) are. These two attributes are in turn decomposed 
into sub-attributes (Level 3). In particular, the modeling 
fidelity      is defined by level of detail represented by 
      (Level 3), and by the number of 
approximations       , whereas the strength-of-
knowledge      is defined by the quality of 
assumptions represented by        and by quality of 
data      . Note that the number of approximations 
       is considered as a basic attribute, since it can be 
measured directly and, thus, it is not broken further into 
other attributes. The other three attributes of Level 3 are 
instead broken down into more basic “leaf” attributes that 
can be measured directly by “inspection” of the model 
whose trustworthiness we want to assess. In particular, the 
level of detail       is characterized in terms of 
number of equations and correlations, namely       , 
number of model parameters, namely       , and 
number of dependency relations, namely        . The 
overall quality of the assumptions         is measured 
by the number of the assumptions made,        , and 
by their impact        (which can be assessed, e.g., by 
sensitivity analysis). Finally, the quality of the data 
       is described in terms of the amount of data 
available, namely        , and by the consistency of 
the data itself, namely       . 
III.B. Analytical hierarchical process (AHP) for model 
trustworthiness quantification 
Given the hierarchical tree in Figure 1, the assessment of 
model trustworthiness is carried out within a multiple 
criterion decision analysis (MCDA) framework [23]; [24]. 
In this setting, we suppose in all generality that the 
system, components, process or phenomena of interest for 
the risk assessment can be obtained by different 
mathematical models,                 of possibly 
different complexities and levels of detail. The task (i.e., 
the MCDA problem at hand) is to rank these alternative 
models with respect to their trustworthiness, in relation to 
the particular risk assessment problem of interest to 
support MCDA. In the present paper, the Analytical 
Hierarchical Process (AHP) is adopted for this [16].  
In the AHP the top goal of the evaluation, i.e., the 
considered decision problem (in this case, the selection of 
the model with the highest trustworthiness), is placed at 
the first level of the hierarchy and it is usually 
decomposed into several sub-attributes distributed over 
different levels. Finally, the bottom level in the hierarchal 
tree-based AHP model contains the different alternatives 
to be ranked with respect to the top goal (i.e., in this case 
the level of trustworthiness) [25]; [16]. Through pairwise 
comparisons among the attributes of the same level, the 
alternative solutions, i.e., models, can be ranked with 
respect to the decision problem in the top level (i.e., the 
identification of the model with highest trustworthiness) 
[25]; [26]. The AHP model for model trustworthiness 
assessment is represented in Figure 1. 
The first step required to assess the model 
trustworthiness by AHP is the determination of the inter-
level priorities (as weights) for each attribute, sub-
attribute, basic “leaf” sub-attribute and alternative 
solution; i.e.,      ,       ,       , and           , 
respectively. Notice that in practice each weight 
represents the relative contribution or importance of an 
attribute of a given level to the corresponding “parent” 
attribute of the upper level: for example, weight W(    ) 
quantifies the importance of basic “leaf” sub-attribute      
(of Level 4) for sub-attribute     (of Level 3); instead, 
weight          , is the inter-level priority of the      
model with respect to the basic “leaf” sub-attribute     . 
The intermediate priorities     ,  (   ) and 
 (    ) are calculated using pairwise comparison 
matrices: in particular a pairwise comparison matrix is 
constructed for each attribute, sub-attribute and basic 
“leaf” sub-attribute. A comparison matrix is a (     
square matrix where n is the number of elements being 
compared. Attributes in each level are compared to each 
other with respect to their importance in describing their 
“parent” attribute in the upper level. For example, a 
(     matrix is constructed to compare the basic sub-
attributes      ,         and         (Level 4) 
with respect to their” parent” sub-attribute       (Level 
3).  Typically, a scale of 1 to 9 is chosen to evaluate the 
“strength” of each criteria with respect to the other; for 
example, a scale used to carry out a qualitative 
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comparison between two attributes A and B can be as 
follows [25]; [27]:  
1: A and B are equally important; 
3: A is moderately more important than B; 
5: A is strongly more important than B; 
7: A is very strongly more important than B; 
9: A is extremely more important than B. 
Values 2, 4, 6 and 8 can be used to facilitate the judgment 
in intermediate situations.  
A pairwise comparison matrix is made for each group 
of attributes in the same level (say s) that falls under the 
same upper attribute in the upper level (s-1).  The weight 
of each attribute is, then, determined by solving an 
eigenvector problem, where the normalized principal 
eigenvector provides the weighting vector (priorities and 
strengths). Instead, for the tangible, basic, “leaf” sub-
attributes      for which a quantitative evaluation can be 
given, the inter-level weights (or parties)            can 
be obtained as:  
 (       )
       
∑        
 
   
,     (1)   
where          is the numerical value that the basic “leaf” 
sub-attribute       takes with respect to model    (for 
example, for attributes        variable          equals 
the number of equations and correlations continued in 
  ).  Finally, notice that if the basic “leaf” sub-attributes 
cannot be given a direct numerical evaluation, the 1-9 
scaling system explained above can be also adopted to 
evaluate the         ’s. Notice that weights obtained 
should be normalized to 1 as follows: ∑         
  
    
where    is the number of attributes under the “top” 
attribute T (i.e., model trustworthiness); ∑          
   
   
 
where     is the number of sub-attributes under attribute 
   ; ∑           
    
    where     is the number of basic 
“leaf” sub-attributes under sub-attribute     ; and finally 
∑             
 
    where n is the number of models. 
After obtaining the weight for each criterion with respect 
to the corresponding upper level criteria, a “global” 
weighting for each criterion with respect to the top goal T 
can also be obtained by multiplying its weight by the 
weights of its upper parent elements in each level: for 
example, the “global” weight (or priority) of basic “leaf” 
sub-attribute       with respect to the “top” attribute (goal) 
T is given by        .       .  
                    . For example, the global 
weighting of the consistency of data with respect to level 
of adequacy is obtained by multiplying its weight by the 
weight of quality of data by the weight of strength of the 
knowledge. Finally, the final trustworthiness        of a 
model    is evaluated using a weighted average of the 
“leaf” attributes as indicated in eq. (2): 
        ∑ ∑ ∑                       (       )
       
∑        
 
   
 
    
   
   
   
  
         (2)  
Where   ,    , and      have been defined above. 
Equivalently, the trustworthiness       can be expressed 
directly as a function of the “global” weights of the leaf 
attributes with respect to the top goal T:  
        ∑ ∑ ∑        (    )
       
∑        
 
   
 
    
   
   
   
  
          (3) 
IV. CASE STUDY 
In this section, the hierarchical tree-based 
trustworthiness assessment approach is applied to a case 
study concerning the modeling of the residual heat 
removal (RHR) system of a nuclear power plant (NPP). In 
section IV.A, the system is described; in section IV.B, the 
characteristics of the two models used to represent the 
system (i.e. the Fault Tree-FT and the Multi-States 
Physics-BASED Model-MSPM) are presented in some 
detail; finally, in section IV.C, the proposed approach is 
applied to evaluate the trustworthiness of the two models. 
IV.A. The system 
The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system of the 
Electricité de France (EDF) CPY900 reactor is taken as 
reference (REF). RHR is mainly used to remove the decay 
heat (residual power) from the reactor cooling system and 
fuel during and after the shutdown, as well as 
supplementing spent fuel pool cooling in the shutdown 
cooling mode [28]. The main components of the RHR 
system are: pumps, heat exchangers, diaphragms, and 
valves. 
According to a study implemented by EDF, it was found 
that 24.2% of RHR system failures are due to pumps 
failure, 64.4% are due to valves failures, 10.6% are due to 
heat exchanger failures, while only 0.8% of RHR system 
failures are due to other components’ failure [11]. 
IV.B. Models considered 
Two models have been considered for evaluating the 
reliability (resp., the failure probability) of the RHR 
system: a Fault Tree (FT) model (Section IV.B.1) and a 
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Figure 2 MSPM analysis: models of RHR components 
more detailed Multi-State Physics-based Model (MSPM) 
(Section IV.B.2). 
IV.B.1. Fault Tree (FT) Model 
The Andromeda software has been used by EDF for 
the analysis of the RHRs’ components failure modes and 
criticalities (importance analysis) [11]; [12]. Actually, this 
analysis provides a logical framework for understanding 
the different possible ways in which the components and 
the system can fail.  
The failure probabilities used in the FT analysis 
provided by EDF are based on field experience [11].  
IV.B.2. Multi-State Physics-based Model (MSPM) 
In engineering systems, most products and 
components wear and degrade over time due to 
operational and mechanical factors, as well as their 
interaction with the surrounding environment and with 
each other [13]. There are many models of degradation 
processes in the bibliography. Physics-based model 
(PBM) and multi-state model (MSM) are often used for 
the degradation processes of components/systems. 
Physics-based model aims to develop an integrated 
mechanistic description of the component/system life, 
consistent with the underlying degradation mechanisms 
(e.g. wear, stress corrosion, shocks, cracking, fatigue, etc.) 
by using physics knowledge and equations, while multi-
state model can be built upon material science knowledge, 
degradation and/or failure data from historical collection 
or degradation tests, to describe the degradation processes 
in a discrete way [29]; [13]. 
In general, MSM is able to describe the evolution of 
degradation with time, when there is a range of states 
from “perfect functioning” to “complete failure”. 
However, since the degradation process is influenced by 
many factors, there are difficulties in estimating the 
transition rates required for the analysis of the degradation 
process, especially for highly reliable components and 
systems [13]. Besides, it is difficult to define precisely the 
states and the transition rates between states in MSMs, 
due to the imprecise discretization of the degredation 
process and to data insufficiency [12]. On the other hand, 
for PBM, the parameteres might be unknown so they are 
usually left to experts judgment. Accordingly, a 
combination of the two models, namely, the Multi-State 
Physics-based Model (MSPM), has been proposed, in 
which the state transition rate estimates are based on 
physical models rather than operation data [30]. Then, the 
whole process of transition and degradation can be 
described comprehensively by MSPM [13]. 
For the case study, the analysis took into account the 
main critical components (i.e. pump, diaphragm, breaker, 
motor, contactor and valve). The MSM was used to model 
the pump, breaker, motor and contactor, while the PBM 
model was used to model valve and diaphragm, taking 
into account the degradation dependency of the valve on 
the pump. 
Figure 2 illustrates this setting. Three states were 
considered for the pump, including the fully functioning 
state, a degradation state corresponding to external 
leakage, and the failure state: thus, three transition rates 
were taken into account. The breaker was modeled by a 
continuous-time homogeneous Markov chain, taking into 
account the perfectly function, and the fully failed states, 
and four types of failures were taken into account. 
Similarly a continuous-time homogeneous Markov chain 
analysis was applied for the analysis of the contactor and 
the motor, and four and two types of failures were taken 
into account for each respectively. 
On the other hand, the valve is subject to thermal 
fatigue that causes cracks or propagation of manufacture 
defects which are described by physical models and the 
related physical variables, such as; the coefficient of 
thermal expansion of the material, the modulus of 
elasticity, the Poisson ratio of the material, the 
elastoplastic strain concentration factors, the number of 
alternating cycles, etc.. The crack initiation takes place 
when the amplitude of variation of the critical temperature 
      is surpassed, while the failure due to propagation of 
defects takes place when a specific number of cycles 
(operation demands) is exceeded. It should be noted that 
the total number of cycles executed over a period of time 
is calculated considering the degradation dependency of 
the valves on the degradation of the pump. In other words, 
when calculating the number of cycles executed by the 
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Figure 3 Hierarchical tree-based AHP model for the 
assessment of the trustworthiness of risk assessment models 
valve, it is multiplied by a factor > 1 to consider the 
degradation dependency on the other components.  
Furthermore, the cavitation and the erosion are taken into 
account for analyzing the degradation and failure of the 
diaphragm. Different physical parameters are considered 
such as pressure, stress, dimension, and other material- 
based characteristics. A threshold value at which the 
failure takes place is taken into account. The results of 
MSPM and FT (using Andromeda software) are given in 
Table 1. The analysis shows similarities in the results in 
the first eight years. A gap between the two results starts 
to appear in the tenth year, showing a more rapid decline 
in the results obtained by MSPM.  
Table 1 Values of reliability computed over time of Andromeda software (EDF) 
Time (years) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 









































IV.C. Quantitative evaluation 
The analysis is carried out through two main steps: 
the first is an “upward” evaluation of the weight of each 
element in the hierarchy tree with respect the top goal 
(model trustworthiness); the second is a “downward” 
assessment of the model trustworthiness by means of a 
numerical evaluation of the basic “leaf” elements for both 
models FT and MSPM, as shown in Figure 3. 
With respect to the weights evaluation, experts from 
EDF were asked to fill the pairwise comparison matrices, 
in order to evaluate the importance of each attribute 
(criteria). Experts were equally qualified and the inputs 
were averaged for simplicity. The attributes relative 
importance with respect to the parent attributes have been 
evaluated using the 1-9 scaling. 
For the second step of “upward” calculation, two 
types of trustworthiness analysis have been implemented: 
one has been performed through a direct quantitative 
evaluation of the leaf attributes (e.g., the number of model 
parameters are counted, for each model); the second is 
based on a semi-quantitative evaluation of the leaf 
attributes carried out through comparing the two models 
to each other and to the state of the art, and then, 
assigning a relative score (1-9) for each leaf attribute.  
Relying on the data and technical report [11] used by 
EDF to perform the risk assessment, the trustworthiness 
evaluation was performed for both FT and MSPM 
models, as illustrated in Tables 2 and 3. 
The level of trustworthiness was found to be 4.6506 
for FT (M1) and 5.8535 for MSPM (M2). 
We applied the same method also to evaluate the models 
trustworthiness T using the direct quantification of the 
“leaf” attributes. The results are reported in Table 3 and 
Table 4 shows all results. 
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Model trustworthiness T  S1 1 1 - 4.6506 - 5.8535 
Modeling Fidelity F (  ) S2 0.35 0.35 - 1.5124 -  2.3678 
Number of 
approximations 
Ap (   ) S3 0.54 0.189 6 
1.1340 
7 1.323 
Level of detail D (   ) S3 0.46 0.161 - 0.3784 - 1.0448 
Number of equations 
and correlations 
Q (    ) S4 0.4638 0.0747 3 
0.2240 
8 0.5973 
Number of model 
parameters 
Mp (    ) S4 0.2114 0.0340 3 
0.1021 
7 0.2383 
Number of dependency 
relations  
Dr (    ) S4 0.3248 0.0523 1 
0.0523 
4 0.2092 
Strength of Knowledge K (  ) S2 0.65 0.65 - 3.1382  - 3.4857 
Quality of data QD (   ) S3 0.51 0.3315 - 2.0553  - 2.2542 
Amount of data Ad (    ) S4 0.6 0.1989 5 0.9945 8 1.5912 
Consistency of data C (    ) S4 0.4 0.1326 8 1.0608 5 0.663 
Quality assumptions QA (   ) S3 0.49 0.3185 - 1.0829  - 1.2315 
Number of assumptions As (    ) S4 0.2 0.0637 5 0.3185 6 0.3822 
Impact of the 
assumptions 


















Model trustworthiness T  S1 1 1 - 57.15 - 111.7 
Modeling Fidelity F (  ) S2 0.35 0.35 - 0.374 -  1.3641 
Number of 
approximations 
Ap (   ) S3 0.54 0.189 7 0.027 7 0.027 
Level of detail D (   ) S3 0.46 0.161 - 0.347 - 1.3371 
Number of equations 
and correlations 
Q (    ) S4 0.4638 0.0747 1 0.0747 9 0.672 
Number of state rates 
and parameters 
Mp (    ) S4 0.2114 0.0340 8 0.2723 18 0.6128 
Number of dependency 
relations  
Dr (    ) S4 0.3248 0.0523 0 0 1 0.0523 
Strength of Knowledge K (  ) S2 0.65 0.65 - 56.7772  - 110.33 
Quality of data QD (   ) S3 0.51 0.3315 - 55.758  - 109.89 
Amount of data Ad (    ) S4 0.6 0.1989 275 54.698 549.15 109.22 
Consistency of data C (    ) S4 0.4 0.1326 8 1.0608 5 0.663 
Quality assumptions QA (   ) S3 0.49 0.3185 - 1.0192  - 0.4463 
Number of assumptions As (    ) S4 0.2 0.0637 4 0.2548 3 0.1911 
Impact (Sensitivity 
analysis) 
I (    ) S4 0.8 0.2548 3 0.7644 3.3333 0.2552 
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Table 4 Summary of models trustworthiness 
Normalized Trustworthiness FT MSPM 
 Scale 1-9 measures 0.4427 0.5573 
Direct measures 0.3365 0.6635 
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this work, we have developed a hierarchical tree-
based decision making approach to assess the 
trustworthiness of risk models. The approach is mainly 
based on the identification of specific attributes that are 
believed to affect the trustworthiness of the model. This is 
obtained by a hierarchical-tree based “decomposition” of 
the model trustworthiness into sub-attributes. The AHP 
method has been used to perform a weighted aggregation 
of the attributes to evaluate the model trustworthiness. 
The method has been applied to a case study involving the 
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system of a Nuclear 
Power Plant (NPP). Two models of different complexity 
(i.e., FT and MSPM) have been considered to evaluate the 
system reliability and the trustworthiness of such models 
has been compared. 
FT trustworthiness has been found to score 4.8205 out of 
9, whereas MSPM has scored 5.8535 or 0.3365 and 
0.6635, respectively, by direct measures of “leaf” 
attributes.  The two results confirm the expectation that 
MSBM provides more trustworthy risk estimates than FT 
due to the fact that it takes into account components 
failure dependency relations and time dependency.  
Of course, we do not claim that the trustworthiness 
approach is comprehensive and complete, as there exist 
other factors that affect the level of trustworthiness, which 
were not considered for simplicity. Also, further studies 
should be performed to define the scaling guidelines for 
attributes evaluation.  
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